quantitative, rather than qualitative, nature.3 This deduction has been supported since by another patient, "Q," who had a large astrocytoma of the right frontal lobe. It was large enough, evidently, to impair the function of the opposite lobe, since right lobectomy relieved the symptoms. Prior to operation, "Q" had a FIG. 1. The small circles represent relatively simple "caudal" engrammes, synthesized from still simpler ones. For the saka of clarity in the drawing, these "still simpler" engrammes are indicated merely by the arrows converging upon the small circles. The large circles signify the most complex engrammes, formed by the synthesis of those represented by the small circles. The partial decussation is indicated only for this particular caudo-frontal synthesis, in order to make the diagram simpler and more easily legible.
FIG. 2. Anatomical representation of normal thinking.
The meaning is the same as that expressed in Fig. 1 . Instead of circles, actual thoughts are represented. Most caudally, the thoughts are simplest. One way is shown in which the complex thought "courage is admirable" might be constructed out of a number of simpler engrammes. The partial decussations should really be indicated throughout, in the whole caudo-frontal relationship. This was not done, for the sake of clarity in the drawing. The principle is shown, however, by the occurrence of each engramme on each side. symptom which I called "conscious inability to synthesize thoughts." A certain group of thoughts, which belonged together in a unified composite, would be present. "Q" would find that he could amalgamate most of them into the proper single unit, but that one would remain unconnected with the rest,-that this one would recede, and that, although clearly existent as an entity, it could not be conceived of as a part of the total picture.5 This phenomenon appeared to show, in a direct manner, the synthesizing action of the frontal cortex.
The appearance is, then, that units of thought are combined in their simplest forms in the more caudal parts of the cortex, and that increasingly complex combinations occur further and further forward, until, in the frontal part, the combinations are the most complicated of all. If this is true, then these units must have pathways along which they travel. did. This is exemplified in Fig. 3 , which shows how, when one frontal lobe is absent, the connections on the other side still serve adequately.
On the other hand, if both lobes are removed, or otherwise injured, the most complex combinations can no longer be formed. The simpler ones can still be made, however (Fig. 4) 4 . Effect of bilateral frontal lo-sensory apparatus. In those sysbectomy. The complex thought "cour-tems, bilateral representation occurs age is admirable" can no longer be in the brain whenever the periphconstructed. The simpler units of eral organ is a "paired" onethought are not disturbed.
that is, whenever the right and left organs always act as one. Kappers, especially, has stressed and illuminated this matter. Examples in the motor sphere are the muscles of the forehead, tongue, jaw, and larynx. The pyramidal fibers supplying the nuclei for the muscles of these parts are always both crossed and uncrossed; thus, both right and left motor cortices are connected to both right and left nuclei (hypoglossal nucleus, for example). This explains the fact that, in hemiplegia caused by a lesion in one internal capsule, the forehead, tongue, jaw, larynx, etc. are not paralyzed, but are only weakened if, indeed, they are detectably affected at all. On the other hand, these parts are paralyzed when the pathways on both sides are destroyed, as in pseudobulbar palsy. The bilaterality of pyramidal innervation of these and other organs is beautifully demonstrated in the hemispherectomy cases quoted above. In some cases there was weakness of one or another of the paired muscle groups, while in others there was none, but in no instance did paralysis occur.
Similarly, bilateral representation occurs in the sensory domain when the anatomical and functional arrangements are paired, as in the visual, auditory, and vestibular systems.
From these facts and interpretations, intellect appears as a function which can be specifically and accurately linked with cortical neurones, both anatomically and physiologically. It is not a vague, mysterious, intangible thing, but is real and actual. In a word, these observations appear to demonstrate specifically the tangibility and circumscription of intellect when it is viewed as a function of the nervous system.
The evidence which suggests bilaterality of representation in the "neuro-intellectual" system helps to align that system with the neuro-muscular and neuro-sensory ones. It even seems reasonable to speak of a "neuro-intellectual" system, quite comparable to the neuro-muscular and neuro-sensory systems. What, then, is the difference between "neuro-intellectual" function on the one hand and neuro-muscular and neuro-sensory on the other, and why has the former been seen as so vague and indefinable, whereas the latter two, especially the neuro-muscular, are thought of as quite concrete and comprehensible? I think a satisfactory answer can be found in the end-organs with which the various neurone systems are connected. The direct or indirect, but always intrinsic and inevitable, attachment of neuro-muscular neurones to muscles is what has given us our understanding of the behavior and function of those neurones. The fact that the contraction of a muscle is a concrete, observable, measurable phenomenon is responsible for our knowledge-of the neurones which supply the muscles. Similar neurones, not leading inevitably to such concretely behaving end-organs as muscles, are, by that token, certain to be less well understood. This appears to be a reason why the neuro-sensory system occupies a position between the neuro-muscular and neuro-intellectual in our accuracy of comprehension.
In brief, an idea, in contrast to a muscle movement, may be defined as the product of neural activity without an indispensable, intrinsic, fixed end-organ. Many details concerning the similarity between the neuro-intellectual system on the one hand, and the neuro-muscular and neuro-sensory on the other, will be presented in other communications.
One example of the similarity may be given here, however. Cases are seen in which the "epileptic process" acts, not on the neuromuscular or neuro-sensory apparatus, but on that which gives rise to ideas. The symptoms are uncontrollable spasms of ideas instead of muscles. Examples have recently been reported. 4 10, 11 So far, intellect alone has been discussed. However, the changes following either bilateral lobectomy or massive frontal lesions, in-volving every phase of the personality as they do, include not only intellectual, but also emotional processes. Is the cortex then, the seat of both emotion and intellect? A working hypothesis can be employed, which serves as a working answer to this question. This hypothesis is not a new one, although it has found little recognition in the past. Its basis is that emotion is constituted of the combining of feeling-tone impulses (thalamic) with intellect impulses (cortical). When the hypothesis is explored and tested, it proves quite satisfactory in comprehending the action of the different parts of the brain, in terms of the complex functions which bear the names just mentioned. Through it we can see how such emotions as, for example, jealousy, guilt, and loneliness differ from each other. The feeling-tone is similarly unpleasant in all of them; the intellectual component appears to be the differentiating factor.
One can also see how cortical intellectual impulses may impinge upon thalamic and other neurone groups, so .as to modify or control feeling-tone and the expression of primitive, phyletic actions. As intellectual units, or thoughts, become more and more aggregated,-that is, as they combine into continually richer and more complicated groups,-their influence over these more ancient processes, based upon neurones situated lower down, should increase. In such a way as this the restraint upon which social living depends can be visualized. Whether the known principles of physiological inhibition which obtain elsewhere in the nervous system apply here is unknown. It is possible that the "upper" neurones of the frontal lobe have a physiological inhibitory action over the "lower" neurones with which they are connected, and that release of these lower ones occurs when the frontal cortex is removed. This is a subject which might lend itself to accurate investigation. If it turns out to be true, it will unify Jackson's views on levels, in so far as they concern mental processes, with physiological inhibition, and align both with the facts derived from lobectomy studies.
If this presumed "release" follows bilateral lobectomy, why does it not occur when only one lobe is removed? An answer can be given, in terms of the cortex as the organ of intellect,-intellect in the sense just described.
Can these observations and interpretations be brought into clinical psychiatry and neurology? There are many ways in which they can, and in which they appear to clarify to some extent the neural bases of certain neurotic states. These will be described more completely in other papers; illustrative material will be included here.
Such states as these concern, of course, what is called emotion. As stated above, emotion can be thought of as the combined action of neurones of intellect and neurones of primitive feeling-tone. A patient "B" has been observed in whom the epileptic process activated at some times neurones which gave rise to apparently pure feeling-tone, and others, neurones producing an emotion-the emotion of loneliness. 7 Reference has already been made to the sudden activation of neurones of intellect, apparently by the epileptic process or something similar to it. In those instances the thing felt by the patient was essentially intellectual. In the case of "B," however, the things felt by the patient were definitely affective. "B" suffered from both grand and petit mal. Her petit mal attacks were of two types. The first was constituted entirely of an intense feeling of loneliness,-an emotion which in her case consisted of a feeling of sadness combined with certain "lonely" thoughts dating from years before. The other variety of petit mal seizure was composed exclusively of evidently pure feeling-tone content, rather than emotion. It resembled a manic-depressive attack, typical in every way of a psychotic episode except for its abrupt onset and termination, and its extreme brevity. First, there would be about 1 5 seconds of intense depression. This would be succeeded by an equal period of intense elation, after which normality returned.
It was thought that this patient revealed the activation of fixedly linked groups of neurones. One group was concerned with unpleasant feeling-tone and with certain "lonely" thoughts. When it was activated, the result was a feeling, combined with thoughts, of loneliness. The arousal of both feeling and thought together by the same stimulus indicates the reality and the neuronal substructure of "associations," in a psychological sense. The "manic-depressive" episodes suggested that there is a distinct organization of neural structures which can be excited and can act in an isolated manner, producing, sequentially, depressive and manic phenomena. This conception is well supported by a remarkable observation made by Foerster, who produced episodes of typical manic behavior during operations under local anesthesia, by touching an area in the wall of the third ventricle. With each touch of a cotton pledget, the episode occurred; it ceased as soon as the pledget was removed.8 Both of these observations seem to show that phenomena such as manicdepressive episodes can actually result from activation of an isolated neurone group, which may eventually be localized. Foerster's observation goes far to suggest that, at least in one part of its course, it lies in the wall of the third ventricle.
Cases have also been reported in which obsessive and compulsive behavior was activated by the epileptic process.8 In such instances it is not so much that a specific neurone group is activated, as that whatever group is activated is forced by the epileptic process to act in a fixed or repetitive way. A change occurs in the manner of action of neurones, and such a change can be brought about by the action upon those neurones of what we call the epileptic process.
Recently, an observation was made, which showed that such a change in the manner of action of neurones can, indeed, be produced by stimulation,-in that instance, by electrical stimulation. 6 The patient was a right-handed epileptic woman of 32. Under local anesthesia the left side of her cortex was searched electrically, for a trigger point, according to the method of Penfield. A small zone was found which, when stimulated, caused the patient to repeat over and over again whatever she was saying at the moment of stimulation. The patient was required to say the alphabet; -she could be caused to repeat any letter by the application of the electrode as she uttered the letter. The repetition persisted throughout the duration of stimulation. The patient knew that she was repeating, but was powerless to stop it. The repeated letters were slightly distorted. The area which gave rise to the effect was about I cm. in diameter; it lay on the mesial side of the left cortex at about the posterior border of the junction of Brodmann's area 32 and area 6.
The phenomenon of repetition produced in this patient is undoubtedly what is ordinarily called perseveration. Its greatest interest, however, lies less in its identity with clinical perseveration than in its repetitiveness as such. It shows that the physiological state of neurone groups can be altered so that the impulse does not escape from some particular group, but continues to maintain that group in a condition of excitability, as has been postulated by Kubie"7 in his "closed-circuit" theory. There are obvious relations between this and not only clinical perseveration but also all states in which repetitiveness or fixedness of action occurs. Among these should probably be included some types of obsessive and compulsive action. The bearing of the observation upon fixation of attention is also plain.
Especially to be noted is the fact that this influence upon neural activity was originated at a distance from the area which was acting. The patient was speaking and the abnormal activity was originated in the Brodmann area named,-a zone not only far from any part of the speech areas, but even on the mesial side of the hemisphere. Summary A number of observations and interpretations have been outlined indicating the specificity of neural relationship to thought and emotion. Some anatomical factors have been presented, and viewpoints suggested, concerned with both the physiological and pathological aspects of the relationship.
